THE ART OF VALUATING A HERITAGE:
From a Swedish management perspective with past and present examples

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To identify what ought to be protected and why is one of the most important missions of the heritage management. Issues related to values and the act of assessing are, however, seldom scrutinized on a deeper level. The aim of this article is to give a short history of the valuation of the heritage up to the present from a Swedish perspective. Additional aims are to reveal some current and historical trends in order to illustrate the connection between past and present valuation systems, to analyze various issues that have contributed to the current pluralistic approach, and to investigate which theories of values affect our assessments today.

Key words: heritage values, value theories, heritage management, history of heritage, history of heritage values, heritage studies, governmentality studies

INTRODUCTION
Within cultural heritage management we routinely conjure up different values on a daily basis to motivate the preservation of artifacts, monuments, buildings and entire cultural landscapes. Indeed, as archaeologists and antiquarians we are trained and commissioned to select articles of value out of a vast potential heritage. But nothing is static and a closer inspection reveals that the assessment of the heritage has its own shifting history. Different times have emphasized different categories and definitions of values due to changing attitudes as to who has the right to define what should be preserved, but also who the selected
heritage is supposed to represent and, ultimately, why this is important.

But what is a value and what exactly do we mean by a valuable heritage? Generally questions such as these are seldom articulated and even less so evaluated within a heritage management context (see also Biörnstad 1990:4; Almevik & Fridén 1995:92; Mathers et al. (Eds.) 2005; Unnerbäck 2000:30). At times there are exceptions, however, and they tend to coincide with upheaval and major societal (political, ideological and economical) and intellectual transformations. Such a situation has been observed in recent decades: once again the assessment itself has been highlighted both internationally (for recent examples, see Mathers et al. (Eds.) 2005; Smith 2006; Smith et al. (Eds.) 2010; West (Ed.) 2010; Harrison (Ed.) 2010) and from a Swedish perspective, which in turn has revealed pluralistic and contradictory opinions on how to define heritage values.

As will become apparent, several interconnected circumstances have given rise to the present situation. In this paper I will study these factors and analyze different attitudes towards heritage values that are expressed today from a Swedish perspective. Predictably, this situation has not appeared out of nowhere, and in order to scrutinize the current state of affairs it is necessary to thoroughly examine how things were in the past. That is my second intention with this text. A third matter that I will address is the various essential theories of values expressed within the heritage context today. Rather surprisingly, this subject is almost notoriously overlooked in the literature covering the assessment of the heritage; this is especially surprising considering that theories of values form the very foundation of our value systems and ideologies of preservation. The point at issue in this text is in what way various theories fundamentally affect our attitudes towards the heritage.

CULTURAL HISTORICAL VALUES

From a management perspective the heritage is ascribed different categories of values which in turn are ordered in different typologies, and at present several typologies or systems of values expressing more or less different features coexist (e.g. Mason 2008; Lindblad 2009). A joint concept frequently referred to in a Swedish context since the early 20th century is “cultural historical values” (Sw. kulturhistoriska värden). Its definition has varied and mutated over time and at present it is commonly divided into three main categories: knowledge value, emotive (or experiential) value, and use value (Sw. kunskaps-, upplevelse- and
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brukarvärde, see Kulturmiljön som resurs 2007). In addition each of these categories has several sub-values with their own histories which I will summarize in the following sections.

As the term suggests, emotive value is commonly associated with various visual, emotional and social qualities that are believed to foster a sense of existential and social support in life (see also Beckman 1993; Unnerbäck 2000). Among its sub-values we find aesthetic, artistic, symbolic, social, and above all identity aspects. A sub-value with an old aura applied in this context is reverence value (Sw. pietetsvärde) which refers to the veneration for and the sense of connection and kinship to previous generations. Such an attitude towards the heritage was emphasized already in the 16th and 17th centuries and was founded on the Christian ethics fostering a sense of obligation to remember earlier generations by preserving and caring for their remnants. Let me present some examples.

In the mid-16th century the Catholic archbishop Olaus Magnus claimed that it was necessary to preserve ancient monuments since they had originally been erected with the purpose of immortalizing and hence transmitting the memory of the deceased or an important event (Olaus Magnus 2001:64, 67–68, 126). This ethical value of memorial was later articulated and emphasized in the motivations of the first Ancient Monument Act of 1666, as seen in quotations such as, “for the honor of the country and the memorial of our forefathers” and “for our forefathers and our country’s immortal fame” (Kongl: Mayst:tz Placat och Påbudh om Gamble Monumenter och Antiquiteter, 1666 and in Schück 1932:359, 361, my translation). In line with this attitude several concepts referring to the memory of older generations (Sw. minnesmärke, fornminne, kulturminne, my italics) were coined in the 18th and 19th centuries, and as late as in the Ancient Monument Act of 1942 it was explicitly proclaimed that the aim was to “preserve the memory of the native country’s early inhabitants” (SFS 1942:350, my translation; see also Jensen 1998).

A further aspect of the Christian ethic was the condemnation of any disturbance of the dead, including the ancient heathen forefathers. With this in mind it becomes logical that such an approach was expressed in the motivation of the legislation of 1666. In one of its drafts it was regretted that all too few paid their respects to their ancestors and that it was of immense importance to leave “the graves and the bones of our forefathers alone and preserved” (“Ett kort utkast …” Konceptböcker 1932:359, 361, my translation).
1666–1673, B 1:1, Äa 1, ATA, my translation). Olaus Magnus, for his part, strongly condemned any intrusions into graves, especially if the purpose was simple greed – i.e. one of the deadly sins – and the search for hidden treasures (Olaus Magnus 2001:759). Expressing a similar attitude, a royal decree of the 1630s proclaimed that it was forbidden to search for treasures in the mounds at Old Uppsala in Uppland; the reason given was that it was not permissible to disturb the dead (see Jensen 2004). Interestingly enough the same reverence even affected the practice of excavation. In the 1660s the holder of the Chair of Antiquarian Studies, Olof Verelius, conducted an extensive exploration of a mound in Ulleråker, Uppland (Jensen 2004). The mound was excavated from the side and not from the top which was the most common strategy at the time. Verelius motivated his approach by stating that it was less laborious but also that he simply did not want to disturb the souls of the dead.

Looking forward in time, the condemnation of encroachments into ancient graves – what we could call an ethical value of grave protection – was later reproduced within the heritage management well into the 19th century. In 1828 a new Ancient Monument Act was ordained which forbade the excavation of mounds without permission from the state authority in charge. In a draft of the legislation this authorization was motivated by the necessity that “our ancestors’ remains as far as possible can rest in peace in the free Swedish soil” (“PM den 26 november 1827”, Vol. 6. GF&JAA, ATA, my translation). And regarding the then newly ordained Ancient Monument Act of 1867, the archaeologist Herman Hofberg wrote in the same spirit that it was important “to let the dead rest in peace” (Hofberg 1871:8f, my translation).

IDENTITY VALUE AND THE SUBJECT OF OWNERSHIP

By all accounts the most important value appealed to in the motivation for preservation – today often associated with the earlier described category of emotive value – has by tradition been the vital task of the heritage in the construction of collective identities. The previous 17th-century quotations referring to the honoring of Sweden – “for the honor of the country” and for the “country’s immortal fame” – are early illustrative examples of the patriotism which has long been associated with heritage management and the care of materialized histories. In those days the patriotism did not concern everyone; in principle it was limited to the learned and to the aristocratic part of society. The leg-
islation from 1666 was also restricted in the sense that it mainly referred to monuments located on state property. Indeed, it wasn’t until the dawn of the modern nationalism in the 19th century and the legislation of 1828 that the heritage discourse became a communal matter on a larger scale and that all monuments were considered worth protecting irrespective of whose property they were situated on (SFS 1828:78). And, as could be expected, the care of the heritage was during the entire 19th century notoriously motivated by its primary role in the strengthening of Swedish nationalism (Jensen 2009:161).

In today’s post-national, Europeanized and globalized society, it is often argued that the local and regional perspectives have become all the more important within identity-creating processes, and that this in turn has stimulated a profound interest in the local heritage. That is true, but it is also true that a regionalization can be discerned already in the 18th century as a result of the end of Sweden as a great power. The process continued in the century to come, partly due to the movement of modernization, i.e. industrialization, urbanization and increasing internationalization. As it turned out, the rising regionalism in the 19th century – which can be defined as a provincial form of nationalism – ended in a clash between the official representatives of the heritage management and the private and local stakeholders. The latter were organized in regional heritage associations with a joint center of organization, Svenska fornminnesföreningen, founded in 1869.

Historical examples clearly indicate that matters of identity and the view of ownership of the heritage are intimately linked. The conflict outlined above revolved around the issues of who owned the heritage, who had the right to explore it, and who was responsible for its care: the individual citizen or the state, whose power and authority increased during the second half of the century (see also Jensen forthcoming; Hillström 2006:137–149). Within the central administration it was repeatedly argued that it was the state, and hence the population as a whole, who was the prime owner, not the landowner or the person who happened to find an object listed in the Ancient Monument Act. Accordingly it was primarily the interest of the collective, and not the individual, that ought to be prioritized.

A comparison with Norway and Denmark reveals a somewhat different situation. Private ownership and regional independency were more highly appreciated in both of these countries. This included the ownership of and the practice of private ventures connected to the lo-
cal heritage (see Lidén 2005:208–215; Mahler et al. 1983:29ff). That is partly why Norway did not ratify its first Ancient Monument Act until 1905 and Denmark as late as 1937. In Denmark the preservation of monuments was previously based on the landowner’s voluntary protection and on the practice of guarding singular monuments judged as extra valuable (Mahler et al. 1983:29ff; Nielsen 2001). In Norway the authorities took Sweden as an example of why they should not pass a legislation at the end of the 19th century – the main argument was that it would inhibit private ownership of both the land and the actual heritage situated on it (Lidén 2005:208–215).

KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENTIFIC VALUE AND VALUE CONTROVERSIES

By knowledge value (or cognitive value, see Beckman 1993) is simply meant that the heritage is considered a source of information, through which various kinds of knowledge can be constructed. Already in the 17th, 18th and early 19th centuries, the preservation of monuments was partly motivated by moral, pedagogical and didactical aspects – the view that monuments were material witnesses of a past qualitatively superior to the present. However – and even if ancient monuments gained attention as objects of knowledge already in line with the dawning empiricism and the scientific revolution – it was not until the 19th century and especially its second half that care of monuments was actually motivated by their scientific value (Sw. also preparatsvärde). This coincided with the rise of scientism (see Baumer 1970:133ff) and the professionalization of the heritage management along with its integrated fields of knowledge, such as archaeology, ethnology, and the history of art and architecture (Geijer 2004; Gillberg & Jensen 2007). The process of professionalization and scientification implied that numerous domains of knowledge turned into professions, defined as specialized occupations based on formal, preferably academic, education (see Golinski 1998:66ff; Kärnfelt 2000:138ff). Concurrently it also implied the exclusion and the marginalization of the non-official actors within the heritage movement who had previously been regarded as important local representatives from a national perspective.

The professional practitioners soon claimed that it took a trained eye and years of full-time practice to discern the real values embodied in the heritage (Gillberg & Jensen 2007). With real values were primarily meant the material, style and aesthetic of the heritage, not in-
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Tangible features such as folklore and public views expressed by the locals, information that was formerly appreciated by all parties (see also Zachrisson 1997:21). As a result, scientific values were perceived as superior since they were said to deepen the understanding of, and reveal the authenticity of, the heritage itself – in the Ancient Monument Act of 1867 the concept of science was mentioned no less than three times (SFS 1867:71). The supremacy of scientific value was also motivated by that it was founded on objectivity and that it therefore was in the interest of the public in general and not of mere isolated and singular interests (Jensen forthcoming; see also Wetterberg 1992:98f).

The pre-eminence of the scientific value was underlined in 1922 in a government commission evaluating the reorganization of Swedish heritage management. In line with the 19th-century rhetoric of nationalism, the commission concluded that the main aim of the care was to foster love of one’s country (SOU 1922:11–12). This preservation strategy had previously primarily revolved around the motive of reverence which, according to the commission, had produced a narrow-minded view of the heritage definition. In the same sentence it was stated that recent developments within the field of science (i.e. archaeology and the history of art and architecture) had produced a richer and far more nuanced understanding of monuments and buildings from the past. Indeed, the scientific value had in fact turned out to be the most essential one since it had not only deepened our understanding of the heritage but also stimulated the public’s interest. To put it briefly, other values (reverence, national identity, etc.) were in deep need of science to correctly understand the essence of the heritage.

The altered perspective outlined above clearly indicates why the values of knowledge and science came to dominate the ideology of preservation during most of the 20th century, reaching its peak with the neo-positivism of the 1960s and 70s. Consequently, the focus of interest has been on material features (see also Zachrisson 1997:21; Jensen 2006:29). The above perspective also enlightens us as to why the concept of ‘authenticity’ has had such immense importance in the preservation since it is said to reflect the original intentions behind the construction of the heritage.

As it turned out, this shift of focus did not go unchallenged. Far from everyone perceived the value of reverence and the intangible features of the heritage as outdated, and among the private enthusiasts there was a certain reaction against the professionalization and the increasing state
authority. An illustrative example of these diverse attitudes is the artist Gunnar Hallström’s contribution to a conference held in 1921 called “Arkeologerna och vården av de förhistoriska fornminnena” (“Archaeologists and the care of prehistoric monuments”) (RIG 1922). Several well-known Swedish archaeologists including Sune Lindqvist, Birger Nerman, Oscar Montelius and Hanna Rydh participated. Hallström criticized the increasing number of excavations of monumental prehistoric graves since this threatened to diminish their reverence value. Their monumentality and the knowledge that there were still forefathers resting in the graves had a cultural value, Hallström stressed, a value which in turn was augmented by the colorful myths and legends associated with them (RIG 1922:4ff).

In a rather disparaging tone the archaeologist T.J. Arne replied that archaeologists, too, had feelings of reverence for the graves, though not in the same sense as laymen. Instead, the professionals’ reverence was performed rather than felt, through their careful explorations and detailed documentation (RIG 1922:9ff). It should be noted, however, that in an earlier stage of the professionalization the expert’s right to excavate was not taken for granted. In the first decades of the 19th century it was repeatedly argued that only those with scientific training should be allowed to perform excavations (Jensen forthcoming). In his extensive article on monuments and archaeological practice, Johan Haqvin Wallman stressed that even as a scholar, i.e. as an archaeologist, you had to recognize your limits to perform excavations out of respect for the forefathers and the ethical value of grave protection. When selecting objects for excavation, you should consequently concentrate on monuments that were already damaged and disturbed (Wallman 1838:51ff).

In time, divided opinions on the assessment of the heritage would split the professionals, too. At the turn of the 20th century the field of preservation of buildings was represented by both antiquarians and architects. Whereas the former advocated a more materialistic approach emphasizing the value of knowledge, the latter promoted a more artistic one, the visual and the aesthetic, and therefore lay more stress on reverence and emotive values (Wetterberg 1992:98f). This split between an objectified historical and an architectural holistic approach had for a long time an immense influence on the debate on the valuation of the cultural heritage in general and on the building heritage in particular (see Krus 2006:34).
THE VALUATION OF MONUMENTS AND CULTURAL LANDSCAPES

For centuries a monument was valued according to its monumentality and the degree to which it could be associated with a historical person or an event. The legislation of 1828 comprised a list of all categories of monuments considered worth saving. However, in one of its drafts we learn that the original plan was that the forthcoming law would only concern very specific monuments, and that it was merely to prevent these from being accidentally destroyed that the legislation should also be valid for less remarkable ones (“PM 10.3 1828”, vol. 6, serie F1d, GF&JAA, ATA).

Due to its rather uniform definition based on different Ancient Monument Acts (1666, 1828, 1867 and 1942) the selection of monuments that ought to be protected was seen as fairly unproblematic for quite some time. In the 1970s, however, things started to change. It was a decade of upheaval in the history of valuation as the very concept of cultural heritage was radically reassessed. The evolving functional, ecological and economical understanding of man and society led to a shift of focus concerning remains from the past. Up until then the key monuments cared for were prehistoric and medieval ones. In line with the dominating scientific perspective they were first and foremost appreciated as sources of information since they represented times with few if any written testimonies (e.g. SOU 1922:11, p. 7; Curman 1936:234). The variety of monuments and their chorology were fairly well known thanks to a nationwide inventory that had been carried out since the 1930s. Based on decades of experience, and influenced by the ideas of processual archaeology, a decision was made to add functional and economically defined remains used in the sphere of past production and support to the concept of monuments (Selinge 1974; Jensen 2006:40f). To some extent this approach also affected the selection of buildings that were defined as worth saving from a cultural historical perspective (Unnerbäck 1976:26).

A second interacting feature was the alarming state of affairs of the environment and the heritage itself. The immediate and all too obvious threat was the large-scale infrastructural projects, the exploitations of cultural landscapes, and the extensive obliteration of old urban areas. There was a growing awareness that cultural values could easily be replaced by other societal values. And in order to minimise the dam-
ages and assimilate the care of both the environment and the heritage in long-term societal planning (Sw. *fysisk riksplanering*), the Swedish National Heritage Board was commissioned to select and list cultural landscapes perceived as extraordinary valuable from a national and a regional perspective (Thor 1972).

To realize the plan it was necessary to have a well supported value system covering not only single objects but entire cultural landscapes. A main issue concerned the classification of monuments, buildings and cultural landscapes and their spatial pattern in various parts of the country (see Seling 1974; Meschke (Ed.) 1973; Hyenstrand 1971). The initial idea was to select landscapes representing different types of use and various cultural expressions (see Hyenstrand 1990:29). In his plan for preservation from 1971, Åke Hyenstrand listed three different foundations of value (Sw. *värderingsgrunder*): a statistical one that referred to the actual objects (preferably monuments); a topographical one that focused on the environment in relation to the monuments; and, lastly, a historical one representing the historical development of buildings (1971:2f).

This shift of focus – from single monuments to a more holistic perspective in both time and space – implied a redefinition and an extension of the concept of heritage to include entire landscapes. As a sign of the time Klas-Göran Selinge summarized the situation by stating that the prime requirement for a monument to be classified as worth protecting was that it was abandoned, whereas its age was of secondary importance (Selinge 1974:14). The new categories and expressions of values that were introduced – such as “human ecological”, “valuable cultural historical environments”, “environmental value” and “values in relation to environmental perspectives” (Cullberg 1974; Janson 1974:211; Forsström 1978) – clearly mirror the present stress on ecology and the environment.

THE SOCIAL VALUE AND DEMOCRACY AND THE ASSESSING OF THE ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE

The 1970s can also be characterized as the decade when democratic motives were introduced into the sector of Swedish heritage management. In line with the welfare strategy and the official cultural policy the heritage was perceived as a democratic and vitalizing force. To have and to make use of the heritage, it was argued, was a vital human right. And instead of being isolated objects that ought to be pro-
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protected from the people, the heritage was valuated as an integrated social force in the everyday life of the citizens (see also Jensen 2006:38; Harding 2007:169).

In line with this shift of perception, emotive values but also use values were upgraded. The values emphasized were the social and (local) identity aspect (see also SOU 1965:10; SOU 1971:75, p. 184) and above all the scientific value since the former, it was argued once again, was dependent on the results of the latter (Meschke (Ed.) 1973:49; Seling 1972:11; 1974:24). As Axel Unnerbäck put it: “Until as recently as the 1970s, the mention of such emotive values as beauty and identity value was virtually taboo in heritage management: only objective, scientific arguments were permissible when pleading for the preservation of a building or part of it” (Unnerbäck 2000:31). However, this approach “became impossible at a time when society was beginning to demand that heritage management should safeguard not only the traditional historical monuments but also the overall physical social environment, environments illustrating social conditions and helping to give people a sense of identity and historical belonging in their everyday surroundings”, and hence, “at the beginning of the 1980s, an approach was manifested whereby the emotive values had to be allotted the same weight in a preservation case as the traditional scientific properties” (Unnerbäck 2000:31f).

In 1974 Sverker Janson published his thought-provoking book KulTurvård och samhällsbildning in which he drew attention to the present disturbing situation – the assessment of the heritage. The discussions within the heritage management were, according to Janson, at a minimum. This left much to be desired; the valuations made were often unfounded and since the concept of heritage had changed it was no longer enough to rely on an old value system that focused merely on the monuments and on criteria such as age and rareness. In his summary of the situation, he stated that older norms “no longer meet the requirements as the heritage is placed in a wider context, or when the concept has gained a wider meaning” (1974:206, my translation).

A closer examination disclosed a major difference between the assessments of monuments and those of the architectural heritage. According to the definitions and categories given in the legislation, all monuments were generally protected by the law, and their locations were pretty well known thanks to the nationwide inventory. The legislation concerning buildings was weaker except with regard to an ex-
exclusive and limited selection (Janson 1974:211ff). Janson saw the legal protection of monuments as a model and therefore recommended that buildings should be assessed according to a principle based on certain categories of “value groups”, representing different classes of buildings. The value groups in question were divided into architecturally, administratively, traditionally and functionally designed buildings. Furthermore he emphasized the importance of listening to the public’s views on what ought to be preserved (Janson 1974:214). In this context it should be noted that Janson was not the first to advocate a standard of protecting buildings founded on a comprehensive inventory and on the same principles as monuments – this was done already in 1902 by the Royal Academy of Fine Arts in their proposal to improve the care of old buildings (Wetterberg 1992:69). Their attempts were neglected, however!

Initially, the democratic movement regarding the heritage was fostered by the Second World War and the devastating destruction of monuments and architecture on the Continent. The systematic bombing of urban areas and the later remodelling of the same areas in line with the post-war urban development highlighted the need for adequate protection of old buildings. A year after Janson’s book was published, in 1975, the issue of preserving buildings was once again emphasized by the European Council which culminated in the European Charter of the Architectural Heritage (see “Byggnadsvårdsåret 1975”, F 3b, Kulturhistoriska byrån, ATA). Ten years later, the European Council ratified the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe which aimed to endorse the practice and the legislation on the preservation of buildings (Robertsson 2002:30f).

The proclamations in question caused the Swedish National Heritage Board to initiate task groups to evaluate preservation and definitions of cultural historical values in relation to the architectural heritage. One of the task groups performed their work in the 1980s and 90s. Their main results were later presented in two highly influential books, one practically orientated, Fem pelare – en vägledning för god byggnadsvård (Robertsson 2002) and one theoretical, Kulturhistorisk värdering av bebyggelse (Unnerbäck 2002). According to their model, values could be divided into two major categories, documentation/knowledge and emotive, each with several sub-values. Already in 1995, some of the results were presented in a paper by Axel Unnerbäck and Erik Nordin (Unnerbäck & Nordin 1995). In a critical evaluation pre-
sentenced in the same year, however, their model was portrayed as an un-
founded mix of subjective and objective theories of values (Almevik
& Fridén 1995). But the question is: does it have to be a paradox to
concurrently invoke both objective and subjective values in relation
to the heritage? The answer is that it depends on how you define the
meaning of values.

VALUE THEORIES AND HERITAGE
VALUES IN A MELTING POT
Opinions on how to perceive the very essence of values are divided.
These differences are essentially based on different ontological perspec-
tives and on various views on how to relate values to what are com-
monly referred to as facts (see Hollinger 1994:59ff; Bergström 2004).
To put it simply, from an objective perspective values are perceived as
facts and hence something that universally exists – some would even
argue that they have empirical features that can be scientifically evalu-
ated (i.e. value naturalism). As could be expected, from a subjectivist
stance values are understood as nothing but personal or intersubjective
interpretations; they are relative and therefore historically bounded.
However, a circumstance that is notoriously overlooked from a herit-
age perspective is that even though they have diametrically opposed
views when it comes to the essence of values, value objectivism and
value subjectivism have the same idea when it comes to facts which
they both perceive as objective. This is of major importance since cat-
egories of values such as knowledge, documentation and science are
generally perceived as facts from an objective perspective. The philos-
opher Henrik von Wright summarizes the value of subjectivism in the
following way: “It denies that there are common, objective yardsticks
for good and evil, right and wrong, beauty and ugliness. When you dis-
agree about facts you usually can establish what opinion is right and
which are false. Not so when there are disagreeing opinions concern-
ing value issues” (von Wright 1990:86, my translation).

Now, if we take a closer look at the value system presented by Un-
nerbäck and Nordin it will be apparent that it is actually based on this
particular value theory and not, as was suggested in the critical evalu-
ation, on an illogical mix of subjectivism and objectivism. This should
not, however, come as a surprise considering that the most influen-
tial value theory in modern time is precisely the subjective one that
is generally based on the Cartesian dualistic approach implying that
values are subjective and facts objective. That is why the value arguments, put forward during the 19th and especially the 20th century, were generally based on the Cartesian subjectivism. And that is why we so persistently, from a heritage management perspective and especially in the case of monuments, often still refer to the old hierarchical principle of scientific and emotive values respectively: “The two most essential value criteria are slide value, or scientific value, and emotive value, or pedagogical/social value. Of these slide value is considered the prime value base” (see Bilaga 1 in Blomqvist 2004, my translation; for an identical earlier example, see also Jensen 1993:64; for a reverse attitude, see Johansen & Eklöf 2003:7f).

Hence in some sense it is fair to say that value subjectivism has in itself become an important element of the heritage. This is partly true for value objectivism as well since it has not yet been outdated (but see Almevik & Fridén 1995:93). The examples in which it is argued that values in general can be evaluated from an objective perspective – since they are thought to be immanent in the heritage itself – are numerous. Indeed, the notion of objectivity is at the very core of the idea that we can discern the right aesthetic, social, symbolic, traditional, societal and historical value and meaning of an artifact, a landscape, a building or a monument, and that there is something that could be distinguished as a national, European or world heritage.

THE LOCATION OF VALUES AND THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF HERITAGE

Already in the early 19th century, Nils Henrik Sjöborg motivated the care of ancient monuments in the landscape with arguments that it was important for the local population and for the satisfaction of travellers in the countryside (“Plan …”, vol. 3, serie FIV, Åa 2, ATA). The latter argument was also emphasized later, in 1859, by the National Antiquarian Bror Emil Hildebrand (“Motiver …”, FIV:3, Åa 2, ATA). Much later, in an evaluation of the heritage management from 1965, the value of the heritage within the tourism industry and for recreation during leisure time and holidays, defined as social value, was underlined (SOU 1965:10, s. 69ff; see also SOU 1972:45, p. 76 – the first Swedish holiday reform was authorized in 1938). Since then, especially since the 1980s and most notably the 1990s, areas in which the heritage is perceived as potentially useful have expanded radically. More explicitly than ever the heritage is now treated as a resource – it has become se-
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verely instrumentalized – to be used in various contexts, such as in the experience industry, for recreation, and in the economic development on a regional scale (Weissglas et al. (Eds.) 2002; Vestheim 2008; Remmare & Peronius (Eds.) 2008). Hence, the search for new uses within today’s consumerism has enhanced the urge to identify values that can be used within the growing market of attraction and experience. This state of affairs has contributed to the awakening of an old philosophical question: where exactly is the value of the heritage situated; in the heritage itself, in our minds (or, from a discursive perspective, in the language) or somewhere in between?

The concept of intrinsic values (Sw. *intrinsikalt, inneboende or egenvärde* – some see a difference between *intrinsikalt värde* and *egenvärde* while others do not, see Olsson 2002:51–52) is generally associated with the theory of objectivism since values are believed to be immanent in the heritage itself (Almevik & Fridén 1995:93). The examples in which intrinsic values are defined in terms of emotive, document, knowledge and use are numerous: But how could it be argued that the heritage has innate values of its own – is the idea based on some kind of animism? A quite common argument for the preservation of the heritage can be exemplified with the following quotation: “The cultural heritage has an intrinsic value [*egenvärde*] of its own, just by being a cultural heritage” (Vägar till kulturarvet 2004, my translation). There is reason to assume that at the core of this circular argument rests a notion of the heritage having some sort of inner objective force of its own that makes it worth saving; either because it is recognized as a universal phenomenon – a conclusion that has been criticized – or because material features automatically transform into heritage due to a certain age, rareness, etc. Yet another idea often expressed in this context – which I will return to further on – is that the heritage has some sort of undefined innate power that can be used for recreation and emotive purposes (Remmare & Choulier-Renström 2008:17). A third and the most commonly cited idea about innate values is the notion that documentation, knowledge and science are objective and therefore intrinsic. As we all know, objectivism has been severely criticized in the last decades, also within a heritage management context (Smith 2006:51–57). It could also be argued that the choice of which features and details to document, and how they are perceived, is not settled once and for all but is arbitrary depending on what kind of knowledge is being sought and which epistemological tradition filters our perception.
In recent years there is a growing tendency to abandon the idea of intrinsic values, or at least to combine it with what is referred to as extrinsic values, or instrumental values which is often taken as a synonym. From this perspective it follows that the heritage has no value of its own. Heritage is rather the means by which values can be achieved and which in turn can stimulate man’s intrinsic values such as content, happiness and existential orientation (cf. hedonism). From an extrinsic perspective it could be argued that recreation and experience are not the outcome of some innate value of the heritage, but rather the emotions and feelings brought to life in man as a result of visual contact, experience or mere awareness of the heritage. As could be expected, the notion of extrinsic or instrumental values is often expressed in relation to the utility of the heritage; it is also often associated with a more relativistic approach. In the heritage proposition from 1998 (Regeringens proposition 1998/99:114) and in an investigation concerning the industrial heritage presented in the following year (SOU 1999:18), heritage values were defined as socially and historically constructed and therefore relative in character. Hence this perspective was characterized as “instrumental” since the heritage, we are told, is nothing more than the result of our mere desire for it for different purposes (SOU 1999:18, p. 11f).

VALUE CONSTRUCTIVISM IN LATE MODERN SOCIETY

More recently, the number of critical evaluations of values related to the heritage has increased dramatically (e.g. Beckman 1993; Carlie & Kretz 1998; Olsson 2003; Krus 2006; Pettersson 2003; Dahlström Rittsél 2005; Westin 2005). This in turn is due to a number of interrelated factors. One of these is the increase in new value systems within the heritage management based on new criteria (such as economy, narratives, etc.). The second is that heritage values are more regularly compared to other societal values such as social welfare, recreation and the market. Both of these situations have stimulated the need to evaluate the very nature of different value systems and their compatibility. Yet other circumstances are the ongoing international debate, the increasing public concern, and the pluralism of identities that has to be considered in the valuation of the heritage. The upgrading of the intangible heritage and the growing amount of new articles drawn into the heritage sphere are additional vital factors. When it comes to the latter, the search for arguments motivating why new features (such as
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In his article Randall Mason sums up a critical perspective on heritage values in the following generalized way: “The values of heritage are not simply ‘found’ and fixed and unchanging, as was traditionally theorized in the conservation field (i.e. the notion of heritage being intrinsic). Values are produced out of the interaction of an artifact and its context; they don’t emanate from the artifact itself. Values can thus only be understood with reference to social, historical, and even spatial contexts – through the lens of who is defining and articulating the value” (Mason 2008:100). Values are perceived as something that is socially constructed and negotiated and hence as a performative process of evaluation rather than something static and settled once and for all (Smith 2006). Whereas some argue that this process is entirely subjective, and thus has nothing or little to do with the materiality itself, still others, like Mason, emphasize the nexus between man and materiality – a value is the product of the actual context affected by social, political, economical and intellectual issues (see also Westin 2005:78). The philosopher Ayn Rand presents a similar idea in the following way: “Material objects as such have neither value nor disvalue; they acquire value-significance only in regard to a living being – particularly, in regard to serving or hindering man’s goals” (Rand 1984:79).

The movement towards a more relativistic approach is often ascribed to the influence of the postmodern theoretical debate that has been going on for the last decades (e.g. Höjer 2005; Roslund 2006 and contributions in Arkeologi – splittring eller mångfald? 2005 and in Verneideologi 2003). Values, it is argued, are now perceived as anything and nothing since the meaning has been disbanded. We currently live in a value-free world due to postmodern nihilism which has deeply affected the discourse of the heritage. Or has it? From a postmodern value-constructivist perspective – influenced by hermeneutics, phenomenology and poststructuralism – neither values nor facts are perceived as objective; “it abandons the dualisms of facts and values, objectivity and subjectivity, descriptions and interpretations, and gives all methodologies a political coloration while contextualizing all claims, methods, and values” (Hollinger 1994:63). Now, if it is truly accurate that postmodern epistemology and ontology have had such an influence within today’s Swedish heritage management, should we not be able
to find quite a few examples of discussions based on a constructivist and discursive perspective on values, including trials of the value of knowledge, documentation and science?

As to the present Swedish debate on the assessment of the heritage, a perusal of texts reveals two characteristics. Firstly, when specific heritage features are considered, the focus is mainly on the modern part of the heritage and especially on buildings. The reason for the latter is the seemingly never-ending difficulty in assessing the building heritage, as buildings are often active components in the social sphere of life and used on a daily basis. It follows that you have to consider a vast number of interrelated social, cultural historical, functional and economical circumstances simultaneously in the process of assessing their value, which is seldom the case with monuments. For a building to reach the same status as a monument it has to be proven to be “extremely remarkable” from a cultural historical perspective (SFS 1988:950, 2 chapter 1 §). Hence, while the valuation of monuments mainly concerns the topic of what is to be cared for, the issue at stake with buildings is how to motivate the care by finding the right values – this in turn draws the attention to the very meaning of value itself.

A second characteristic that can be distinguished is that most of the texts deal with emotive and use values whereas reflections on values of knowledge, documentation and science are conspicuously absent (for an exception to both of these features, see Carlie & Kretz 1998). It therefore seems safe to conclude that within today’s discourse of heritage, values of knowledge, documentation and science have become black-boxed in the sense that they are taken for granted or perceived as secondary or even unimportant and therefore neglected. On the basis of my evaluation it could be argued, then, that a relativistic approach towards heritage is not so much explicitly based on postmodern theories. It is rather the post- or late modern era and the changing overall (societal) mentality and the consumerism that have influenced the heritage discourse in the sense that we are paying more attention to emotive and use values and to the intangible and instrumental features at the expense of values of knowledge, documentation and science. Finally and consequently, my impression is that even if postmodern epistemology to some extent has indubitably influenced the heritage debate, it is fair to say that the situation should rather be characterized as a radicalization of the Cartesian subjectivism which has already been dominating the field of heritage for centuries!
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS

In Sweden, the care of what has been defined as cultural heritage has since the 17th century been motivated by the reference to different categories of value. The concept of value has mutated over time due to ontological, epistemological and existential transformations and changing ideas on man, society, identity, utility, and life and death (Jensen 1998). In this article I have argued that some of these values have been more persistent and dominating than others. One of the oldest is the ethical value; that is, remembering and caring for the dead, including what was perceived as the heathen forefathers. This value of reverence, however, along with the intangible heritage, was marginalized from a management perspective at the expense of the value of knowledge and science during the course of the 19th and above all the 20th century. It is therefore interesting to note that the ethical value of remembrance as well as the intangible heritage has recently been revitalized within the heritage context (see e.g. Jonsson 2007; Convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage 2003; cf. also today’s issue of repatriation).

Needless to say, the history of heritage values has never been value-free, but is always colored by the will to represent and to be represented and to manifest certain ideals with the ambition of making them prevail in the future. That is why the value of identity – and its rhetorical use within political discourses – has been the most consistent one throughout history. There are, however, different perspectives on man’s role in the process of valuating and on the ontological status of the heritage, and presently we can discern various renderings on the subject that can roughly be divided into an objective, a subjective, and what we could call a constructivist (or a postmodern) perspective. Of these, the Cartesian subjectivism has by far, in fact for centuries, been the most lasting and influential.

The theoretical pluralism within today’s heritage management could be perceived as a problem in the sense that it threatens to undermine the credibility of the assessments we make. Another way of looking at it is to simply accept the situation and hence face the fact that it merely mirrors the present variety of opinions, but also to reversely perceive the pluralism as a positive strength as it forces us to more explicitly argue and motivate our assessments. The latter has turned out to be of immense importance because the heritage management, as noted above, has become increasingly involved in other political and social spheres.
– (Sw. aspektpolitik; SOU 2009:16, pp. 97–234; Regeringens proposition 2009/10:3, pp. 112ff) – but also because of the mounting numbers of both public and private stakeholders that want to assess the heritage on more or less the same terms as the official experts. Recent so-called governmentality studies convincingly demonstrate the way in which globalization, glocalization, post-nationalism and neoliberal reforms have altered the role of the state by diluting the traditional hierarchical and centralized political system, most notably in Europe including Sweden (Swyngedouw; Dean 1999; Lidskog et al. 2005). An increasingly influential deliberative democracy (which among other things assumes a pluralism of values), the increasing deregulation and privatization, decentralization and regionalization, but also the knowledge and network society, have all contributed to a reassessment of the relationship between the state and the civil society. Today’s “governance beyond the state system” has “implied that non-state configurations [have] become increasingly involved in regulating, governing and organizing a series of social, economic and cultural activities” and that “other and often new civil society organizations as well as private actors (stakeholders) [have] become involved in the act of ‘governing’” (Swyngedouw, p. 5, 25).

The tendency today is that while the legitimacy of the official experts is weakened (e.g. Lidskog et al. 2005; Höijer 2006), private actors, organizations and the market have become more influential, even in matters concerning heritage (Thomas 2008). On the one hand this situation can promote democracy in the sense that more people have the opportunity to actively participate in the processes of, as in this case, selecting and valuating the heritage. On the other hand there is also a risk that the same situation will threaten democracy if private, resourceful, marginalizing and even antidemocratic forces take precedence at the expense of public interests and of local as well as ethnic minorities (see also Aronsson 2002:182; Dahlstedt 2000; Lidskog et al. 2005:24). In short, the democratic challenge that we as professionals and experts are facing today is to find a balance between a variety of interests, such as between short-term – often economic – interests and a long-term management perception (i.e. between present and future prospects), between various private and public interests, and between the pluralism of identities that characterizes society today. This requires a heritage management with the ability to critically reflect on current political, economical and social issues. It also requires an abil-
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...to expose and challenge any discriminatory practices, and a management as well as a cultural policy that has the strength to act in an emancipating way. But to make this happen we must continue to ask relevant questions about how heritage is valuated and to assess interests behind value judgments. My ambition with this article has been to illustrate that this could indeed be facilitated by taking a stance on how things were in the past!

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